Ukraine’s Battlefield Innovation and the Urgent Need for Security Guarantees
Ukraine continues to redefine modern warfare through rapid innovation and asymmetric capabilities, demonstrating how a technologically adaptive force can challenge a conventionally superior adversary.
Recent disclosures from Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reveal one of the most consequential naval operations of the war—underscoring both Ukraine’s ingenuity and the strategic lessons the United States and its allies risk overlooking.
A Historic Naval Strike
According to a statement released by the SBU and reported through open-source channels, Ukraine conducted a covert special operation in the Russian port of Novorossiysk that resulted in the disabling of a Russian submarine.
For the first time in history, an underwater drone successfully struck a Project 636.3 “Varshavyanka”–class submarine, a key asset of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
The SBU stated:
“The Security Service of Ukraine carried out another unique special operation and staged a naval ‘showdown’ in the port of Novorossiysk. For the first time in history, underwater drones Sub Sea Baby blew up a Russian submarine of the 636.3 ‘Varshavyanka’ class. As a result of the explosion, the submarine suffered critical damage and was effectively put out of action.”
The Varshavyanka-class submarine—often referred to by NATO as the Kilo-class—is among Russia’s most advanced diesel-electric submarines, designed for stealth operations and long-range cruise missile launches.
Why This Matters for the United States
Ukraine’s expanding use of unmanned maritime systems highlights a decisive shift in modern warfare: low-cost, high-impact platforms can now neutralize strategic military assets once considered highly survivable.
Despite this, the United States has not fully integrated Ukrainian battlefield innovations into its own defense planning. Ukraine is not only defending its sovereignty—it is actively shaping the future of naval and asymmetric warfare.
Failing to absorb these lessons represents a missed opportunity to strengthen U.S. and allied security amid growing global threats.
Security Guarantees: Ukraine and the Taiwan Comparison
As Ukraine demonstrates military effectiveness, it continues to seek durable security guarantees capable of deterring future Russian aggression.
An extended analysis by Ukraine Decoded draws a useful comparison between Ukraine’s position today and U.S. commitments toward Taiwan.
What the United States Guarantees Taiwan
The United States does not currently have a binding treaty obligation to militarily defend Taiwan.
From 1955 to 1980, the U.S. maintained a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan), containing commitments similar to those found in NATO alliances. That treaty was terminated on January 1, 1980, following U.S. recognition of the People’s Republic of China.
In its place, Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in 1979—a domestic U.S. law rather than an international treaty.
Under the TRA, the United States commits to:
Providing Taiwan with defensive arms and services
Treating coercion or force against Taiwan as a threat to regional peace and of “grave concern”
Maintaining the U.S. capacity to resist such threats
Crucially, the TRA does not legally require U.S. military intervention in the event of an attack.
Strategic Ambiguity—and Its Limits
This deliberate lack of clarity underpins the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity, intended to deter aggression while preserving flexibility.
While U.S. presidents—including President Joe Biden—have publicly stated that U.S. forces would defend Taiwan, such remarks have consistently been clarified as non-binding and consistent with existing policy. Verbal assurances do not create legal obligations.
The distinction is critical.
Ukraine’s pursuit of security guarantees risks falling into a similar gray zone—where political statements and frameworks exist, but binding enforcement mechanisms do not.
The Core Lesson for Ukraine
Any U.S. defense of Taiwan would ultimately stem from policy decisions, not treaty obligations. The former U.S.–Taiwan defense treaty was formal and binding; the current framework is statutory and intentionally non-committal.
For Ukraine, the implication is clear: lasting security requires enforceable guarantees, not informal assurances.
As Ukraine continues to innovate militarily and absorb the costs of defending Europe’s eastern flank, the question facing Western policymakers is no longer whether Ukraine has proven its value—but whether the West is prepared to match that commitment with credible, long-term security structures.
